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The Publicization of Home-Based Care 
Work in State Labor Law 
Peggie R. Smith† 
Home-based care workers have experienced a labor meta-
morphism of sorts over the last decade. The workers, most of 
whom are women,1 care for children and the elderly from with-
in the private sphere of the home in exchange for compensa-
tion.2 Once invisible and ignored, they have become darlings of 
the labor movement. While they have not halted the persistent 
decline in union density, they have helped to reinvigorate orga-
nized labor. The transformation first attracted national atten-
tion in 1999 when the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) won the right to represent 74,000 home care workers in 
Los Angeles, California.3 The victory marked the largest in-
crease since 1941 in new union membership resulting from a 
single union election.4 Six years later, SEIU charted new terri-
tory once again when more than 49,000 family child care pro-
viders in Illinois voted overwhelmingly to join the union.5 The 
 
†  Professor of Law, University of Iowa, College of Law. J.D., Harvard 
Law School, 1993; M.A., Yale University, 1990; B.A., Yale University, 1987. 
For helpful comments and suggestions during the writing of this Article, I 
wish to thank Rafael Gely and Margaret Raymond. The research for this Ar-
ticle was supported by an appointment at the Obermann Center for Advanced 
Studies at the University of Iowa. Copyright © 2008 by Peggie R. Smith. 
 1. Ninety percent of all nursing home aides and home care aides are 
women. Rhonda J.V. Montgomery et al., A Profile of Home Care Workers from 
the 2000 Census: How It Changes What We Know, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 593, 
595 (2005). 
 2. See infra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (defining family child 
care and home care). 
 3. Linda Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker Organizing in California: 
An Analysis of a Successful Strategy, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 1, 2 (2002). 
 4. Id.; Stu Schneider, Victories for Home Health Care Workers, DOLLARS 
& SENSE, Sept.–Oct. 2003, at 25, 26. 
 5. Peggie R. Smith, Welfare, Child Care, and the People Who Care: Union 
Representation of Family Child Care Providers, 55 KAN. L. REV. 321, 321 
(2007). 
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vote netted labor its second largest membership election since 
1941.6  
In accomplishing these victories, the labor movement dis-
pelled the myth that, because home-based care workers toil in 
the private setting of the home and are isolated from each oth-
er, they are unorganizable. Labor also perfected a new model of 
organizing, one capable of representing the workers even as the 
law views many of them as independent contractors who lack 
rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).7 
This Article examines the labor movement’s campaign to 
unionize home-based care workers, who are often deemed inde-
pendent contractors, in both the child care and home care sec-
tors. It focuses specifically on those workers who provide pub-
licly subsidized care. In the wake of strong union advocacy, 
states have utilized various measures including legislation, gu-
bernatorial executive orders, ballot initiatives, and intergo-
vernmental cooperation agreements to extend labor law rights 
to this group of workers. Although the measures differ in terms 
of the actual bundle of rights granted, most share a common 
structural feature: they designate a state agency to function as 
an employer of record for the workers and to recognize a union 
representative on their behalf. To date, at least thirteen states 
have adopted such measures.8  
The success of these recent state developments, which 
promise to improve the situation of home-based care workers, 
hinges significantly on transformations in the delivery of pub-
licly subsidized child care and home care. Increasingly, states 
rely on individual care workers, rather than agencies that em-
ploy care workers, to deliver publicly funded care. For example, 
consumer-directed home care programs, which allow clients ra-
ther than home care agencies to hire and supervise workers, 
are growing in popularity.9 Similarly, the use of family child 
care, whereby a provider cares for children in her own resi-
dence, is expanding relative to center-based child care.10  
 
 6. Id. 
 7. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (“[The] term ‘employee’ . . . shall not in-
clude . . . any individual having the status of an independent contractor.”). 
 8. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text (listing states and their 
respective governmental measures). 
 9. A.E. Benjamin, Consumer-Directed Services at Home: A New Model for 
Persons with Disabilities, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 80, 81. 
 10. ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., THE STUDY OF CHILDREN IN FAMILY CHILD 
CARE AND RELATIVE CARE: HIGHLIGHTS OF FINDINGS 1 (1994) (“Care in the 
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In both the family child care and home care settings, the 
state pays workers to provide care,11 yet the compensation 
rates are too low to ensure a decent wage.12 In addition, most 
states insist that home-based care workers are not government 
employees, but rather independent contractors to whom states 
owe no obligation under applicable labor and employment 
laws.13 This dynamic has set the stage for union efforts to gain 
collective bargaining rights on behalf of publicly subsidized 
home-based care workers in order to provide such workers with 
a voice in negotiating with government agencies over the terms 
of their labor arrangements. 
I.  BACKGROUND: THE SHARED CHARACTERISTICS OF 
HOME-BASED CARE WORK   
This Article uses the phrase “home-based care work” to re-
fer to two types of paid caregiving that occur within the home: 
home care and family child care. Home care refers to in-home 
services provided to elderly and/or disabled individuals who re-
quire assistance with personal care tasks such as grooming, 
dressing, and bathing, and household activities such as shop-
ping, cleaning, and meal preparation.14 Most home care con-
sumers are elderly individuals with long-term-care needs.15 
 
home of a provider is the most prevalent form of child care for young children 
with employed mothers in the United States today.”). 
 11. JOSHUA M. WIENER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE COST CONTAIN-
MENT INITIATIVES FOR LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE 13 
(2000), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000056.pdf. 
 12.  Paula England et al., Wages of Virtue: The Relative Pay of Care Work, 
49 SOC. PROBS. 455, 455 (2002) (explaining that those engaged in care work 
receive lower wages than expected based on their qualifications and the skill 
required for the job); Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational 
Employment and Wages, 2006 (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf (listing lower wages for home-based care workers 
than for coatroom attendants). 
 13. See Peggie R. Smith, Home Sweet Home? Workplace Casualties of Con-
sumer-Directed Home Care for the Elderly, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 537, 556 (2007) (discussing the desire of states to craft consumer-
directed home care programs so as to avoid liability to workers under labor 
and employment laws); Smith, supra note 5, at 353–56 (discussing how Rhode 
Island avoided workplace obligations to family child care providers through 
litigation). 
 14. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-96-5, LONG-TERM CARE: 
SOME STATES APPLY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS TO HOME CARE WORK-
ERS 2 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/pe96005.pdf; Delp 
& Quan, supra note 3, at 3.  
 15.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that the 
typical home care recipient is “a woman with functional limitations who is 
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Family child care refers to child care services that a worker 
provides for compensation in her own residence to two or more 
unrelated children.16  
Although the exact number of workers in home care and 
family child care is unclear,17 researchers agree that the work 
is expanding. Indeed, the demand for home care is so strong 
that the job ranks among the top three industry sectors where 
experts project employment to grow the fastest over the coming 
years.18 Employment in family child care is also on an upward 
trajectory; in many areas of the country, it is the fastest-
growing segment of the child care industry.19  
 
very elderly, has a low income, and lives alone”); Benjamin, supra note 9, at 80 
(reporting that a majority of long-term care recipients are elderly individuals 
who are cared for primarily in their homes). 
 16. KATIE HAMM & AVIS JONES-DEWEEVER, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY 
RESEARCH, FAMILY CHILD CARE: RECENT TRENDS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 1 
(2004), available at http://www.kwdi.re.kr/data/wotrend2/family_child_care_ 
trends.pdf (describing family child care “as a paid provider who cares for two 
or more unrelated children in her home, although the provider may care for 
her own children at the same time”).  
 17. See ALICE BURTON ET AL., CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, 
ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. CHILD CARE WORKFORCE 
AND CAREGIVING POPULATION 17 (2002), available at http://www.ccw.org/ 
pubs/workforceestimatereport.pdf (estimating that there were 650,000 family 
child care providers caring for children aged five and under, excluding care 
provided by relatives for pay); see also AMY R. GILLMAN, SURDNA FOUND., 
STRENGTHENING FAMILY CHILD CARE IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 3 (2001), 
available at http://www.surdna.org/usr_doc/childcare.pdf (“Family child care is 
the fastest-growing segment of the child care industry and represents the most 
frequently used ‘out of home’ care in the country.”); Daniel E. Hecker, Occupa-
tional Employment Projections to 2014, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 2005, at 70, 
75 tbl.2 (reporting that 624,000 home-health aides were employed in 2004, 
and that 701,000 personal and home care aides were employed in 2004). But 
see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WHO CARES FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN? CHILD 
CARE POLICY FOR THE 1990S 151 (Cheryl D. Hayes et al. eds., 1990) (suggest-
ing that these figures do not capture the full extent of the workforces given 
that “many family day care providers operate in the underground economy” 
and therefore “precise estimates of their numbers and the number of children 
they serve are illusive”). 
 18. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Tomorrow’s 
Jobs, in OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 1, 6 fig.7 (2008–09), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/reprints/ocor001.pdf (projecting personal and home care 
aides as the second fastest growing occupation between 2006 and 2016, and 
projecting home health aides as the third fastest growing occupation between 
2006 and 2016); see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
Health Care, in CAREER GUIDE TO INDUSTRIES 231, 234 (2006–07), available 
at http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/pdf/cgs035.pdf (projecting a 66.4% growth rate for 
home health aides and a 60.5% growth rate for personal and home care aides 
between 2004 and 2014).  
 19. See GILLMAN, supra note 17, at 3 (“Family child care is the fastest-
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The entry of women into the paid work force, and the 
changing structure of family life, has fueled the growth in both 
job sectors.20 With respect to child care, the labor force partici-
pation rate for women with children under six years of age has 
risen from 18.6% in 196021 to 62.6% in 2005.22 Because of this 
dramatic climb, many parents substitute paid child care for 
maternal care; for small children, families prefer family child 
care to other child care options such as center-based care.23 The 
link between family child care’s growth and the increase in 
women’s labor force participation also reflects the effects of wel-
fare reform legislation enacted in 1996.24 The legislation condi-
tioned receipt of benefits on employment, pushing mothers into 
the workforce, and thus bolstered the demand for child care, 
especially family child care.25  
In the context of home care, the rise in women’s labor force 
participation has combined with the graying of America to fuel 
the growth in the home care industry. As a result of aging baby 
boomers, seventy-two million Americans will be sixty-five or 
older by 2030,26 double the number of Americans who were six-
ty-five or older in 2000.27 In most households with elderly fami-
 
growing segment of the child care industry and represents the most frequently 
used out of home-care in the country.”). 
 20. Smith, supra note 5, at 325. 
 21. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
1999, at 417 tbl.659 (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/ 
99statab/sec13.pdf (providing the percentage of married women in the work-
force with children under six). 
 22. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPU-
LATION SURVEY, 2005 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT 13–15 
tbl.5 (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-table5-2006.pdf; see also 
JODY HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP 214 fig.A.2 (2000) (graphing the labor 
force participation rate of women with children between 1940 and 1999). 
 23. GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. 
 24. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1305 (2000)); see also Bruce Fuller et al., Welfare Reform and Child Care Op-
tions for Low-Income Families, FUTURE OF CHILD., Feb. 2002, at 97, 102 (not-
ing that—by conservative estimates—welfare reform prompted the movement 
of at least one million children into child care settings between 1996 and 
1998). 
 25. See GILLMAN, supra note 17, at i (“With the advent of welfare reform, 
family child care has been touted by policymakers and others as a cost-
effective way to . . . expand the child care supply in low-income communi-
ties.”). 
 26. WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2005, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209 
.pdf. 
 27. Id. 
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ly members who need long-term care, women serve as informal 
care providers.28 This provider pool is shrinking, however, as 
more and more women find it impossible to adequately care for 
aging relatives while also both working outside of the home and 
caring for children.29 To address this caregiving gap, house-
holds are turning to home care workers.  
Despite the rapid growth of the industries and the in-
creased demand for home-based care workers, a shortage of 
qualified workers characterizes home care and family child 
care; moreover, high job turnover rates within the industry 
greatly exacerbate this problem. In the home care field, studies 
indicate that as many as half of all workers quit their jobs 
every year.30 High turnover rates create general disruptions for 
clients and compromise the quality of care clients receive, as 
fewer workers often translate into clients receiving fewer hours 
of needed care.31 Inadequate care caused by high turnover can 
ultimately result in serious consequences,32 such as client hos-
pitalization and even a client’s relocation to an institutional 
setting such as a nursing home. 
 
 28. EMILY K. ABEL, WHO CARES FOR THE ELDERLY? 4 (1991) (commenting 
that women represent seventy-two percent of all caregivers for the elderly); see 
also BELDEN RUSSONELLO ET AL., AM. ASS’N FOR RETIRED PEOPLE, IN THE 
MIDDLE: A REPORT ON MULTICULTURAL BOOMERS COPING WITH FAMILY AND 
AGING ISSUES 55 (2001), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/in_the_ 
middle.pdf (noting that women are much more likely to “talk to doctors, ar-
range for aides, and help with personal care”). 
 29. See NORA SUPER, NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, WHO WILL BE THERE 
TO CARE? THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN CAREGIVER SUPPLY AND DEMAND 11 
(2002), available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_bp/BP_Caregivers_1-02.pdf 
(“Women, who traditionally cared for their parents, are now more likely to be 
in the workforce, and are having children later in life. These individuals are 
popularly called the ‘sandwich generation,’ because they are squeezed between 
parents and children.”). 
 30. CANDACE HOWES, WAGES, BENEFITS AND FLEXIBILITY MATTER: 
BUILDING A HIGH QUALITY HOME CARE WORKFORCE 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/download/HowesSummaryFinal.pdf. 
 31. Id.; see also IRMA C. BERMEA, TEX. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., EVALUA-
TION OF PERSONAL ATTENDANT TRAINING PROGRAMS 9 (2001), available at 
http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/publications/SB95reportMarch2001.pdf (comment-
ing on the shortage of home care workers in Texas and stating that “[f ]or some 
disabled individuals, it means a lack of access to the home health care services 
they need to live healthy and productive lives”). 
 32. See ROBYN I. STONE & JOSHUA M. WIENER, WHO WILL CARE FOR US? 
ADDRESSING THE LONG-TERM CARE WORKFORCE CRISIS 14–15 (2001), availa-
ble at http://www.rwjf.org/files/publications/other/CareForUs.pdf; Robyn 
Stone, The Direct Care Worker: The Third Rail of Home Care Policy, 25 ANN. 
REV. PUB. HEALTH 521, 525 (2004). 
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In the context of family child care, between twenty-three 
and fifty-nine percent of family child care providers leave their 
jobs each year.33 Such instability can undermine children’s 
sense of security and hinder their social development.34 Turno-
ver can also adversely impact the workplace opportunities of 
parents who must miss work in order stay home with a child 
when a care provider quits.35 
The demographic profile of home-based care workers com-
bined with their economic status and poor working conditions 
help explain the difficulty in maintaining a stable workforce. 
Women account for the overwhelming majority—at least ninety 
percent—of home care workers36 and family child care provid-
ers.37 As with paid care work generally, race and ethnicity 
heavily mediate these occupations, resulting in overrepresenta-
tion of women of color, especially African Americans and Lati-
nas.38 Many of the workers are also immigrants, especially in 
the home care context.39 
 
 33. Christine M. Todd & Deanna M. Deery-Schmitt, Factors Affecting 
Turnover Among Family Child Care Providers: A Longitudinal Study, 11 EAR-
LY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 351, 352 (1996). 
 34. See id. at 351–52 (explaining that stable care arrangements produce 
higher levels of social development and academic achievement). 
 35. See HEYMANN, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that many parents cannot 
leave work to care for a sick child).  
 36. See Montgomery et al., supra note 1 (reporting that ninety percent of 
all home care workers are women). 
 37. MARY C. TUOMINEN, WE ARE NOT BABYSITTERS: FAMILY CHILD CARE 
PROVIDERS REDEFINE WORK AND CARE 5 (2003) (reporting that over ninety-
eight percent of all family child care providers are women). 
 38. See STEVEN L. DAWSON ET AL., PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE 
INST., DIRECT-CARE HEALTH WORKERS: THE UNNECESSARY CRISIS IN LONG-
TERM CARE 12 (2001), available at http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/ 
download/Aspen.pdf (reporting that thirty percent of healthcare paraprofes-
sionals are women of color); TUOMINEN, supra note 37, at 6 (“While women of 
color represent 13 percent of paid workers in the United States . . . women of 
color make up one-third of all paid child care workers . . . .” (citations omit-
ted)); Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Care, Inequality, and Policy, in CHILD 
CARE AND INEQUALITY: RETHINKING CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 
133, 133 (Francesca M. Cancian et al. eds., 2002) (“[W]omen of color are over-
represented in many of the most poorly paid caring jobs.”); Montgomery et al., 
supra note 1 (“Almost half of the direct care workers . . . are non-White or His-
panic.”). 
 39. See Montgomery et al., supra note 1, at 595; see also Lynn May Rivas, 
Invisible Labors: Caring for the Independent Person, in GLOBAL WOMAN: NAN-
NIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 70, 73 (Barbara Ehre-
nreich & Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2002) (noting that a significant propor-
tion of personal attendants are immigrants). 
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As a group, home-based care workers are disproportionate-
ly poor and low-income women whose earnings place them near 
the bottom of the economic ladder. In 2006, they earned less 
per hour than workers employed as locker room and coatroom 
attendants, gaming-booth cashiers, meter readers, and bicycle 
repairers.40 In addition, most home-based care workers do not 
receive job-related benefits such as health insurance, medical 
leave, or retirement plans.41  
These disadvantageous working conditions hinge, in part, 
on the work’s close association with women’s unpaid work in 
the home, and the traditional views regarding such work. 
Home-based care workers suffer from society’s perception that 
family caregiving is unskilled labor with limited economic val-
ue, and the belief that women should perform such activities 
not for money, but out of love.42 Consistent with this traditional 
view, research reveals that individuals who work in caregiving 
jobs experience a “wage penalty” that captures the social and 
economic devaluation of care work.43  
The low earnings in home-based care work also highlight 
the point that those who most need care, including children and 
the elderly, are often least able to pay for it.44 Absent family 
members providing informal care or paying for formal care, in-
dividuals in need of care routinely rely on the government for 
 
 40. Press Release,  Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 12, at 14–21 
(comparing the median hourly wages of the following jobs: child-care workers 
($8.48); personal and home care aides ($8.54); locker room and coatroom at-
tendants ($8.95); booth cashiers ($9.94); utility meter readers ($14.58); bicycle 
repairers ($10.48); and service station attendants ($8.53)). 
 41. See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, A PROFILE OF THE 
SAN MATEO COUNTY CHILD CARE WORKFORCE 4 (2002), available at http:// 
www.sanmateo4cs.org/altruesite/files/4cs/GetFacts/2002ChildWorkforce.pdf; 
see also Smith, supra note 5, at 334 (“Rarely do [family child care] providers 
receive benefits such as health insurance, vacation time, or retirement 
plans.”). For sources that discuss this issue in home care, see DAWSON ET AL., 
supra note 38, at 6 (“[The] quality of direct-care jobs tends to be extremely 
poor. Wages are low and benefits few; ironically, most direct-care staff do not 
receive employer-paid health insurance.”), and Rebecca Donovan, “We Care for 
the Most Important People in Your Life”: Home Care Workers in New York 
City, WOMEN’S STUD. Q., Spring/Summer 1989, at 56, 62 (1989) (reporting on 
the lack of healthcare benefits available to home care workers). 
 42. TUOMINEN, supra note 37, at 88–89. 
 43. See, e.g., England et al., supra note 12, at 455 (“When we say that 
doing care work entails a ‘wage penalty,’ we mean that those in these occupa-
tions receive, on average, lower hourly pay than we would predict them to 
have based on the other characteristics of the jobs, their skill demands, and 
the qualifications of those holding the jobs.”). 
 44. Id. at 456. 
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assistance.45 Unfortunately, the reality of inadequate public 
support for family caregiving has troubling implications for 
those home-based care workers who provide publicly subsidized 
care. The high cost of and increasing demand for family care 
has led states to explore and adopt cost-savings strategies. In 
the context of child care, states regard family child care as a 
cost-effective approach to help meet the child care needs of 
women transitioning from welfare to work.46 Similarly, in the 
context of home care, policymakers view consumer-directed 
home care as less costly than traditional agency-based home 
care.47 Yet while these strategies may save money, states fre-
quently fail to consider the cost borne by publicly subsidized 
workers in the form of low compensation rates and a lack of 
benefits.48 While these problems adversely impact all workers 
who deliver subsidized care, they fall disproportionately on 
workers regarded as independent contractors of the state. Both 
family child care providers and consumer-directed home care 
workers tend to receive less than their cohorts—who work for 
child care centers and home care agencies—although they each 
provide the same care.49  
II.  CHALLENGES TO EMPOWERING HOME-BASED CARE 
WORKERS   
Various factors have contributed to the labor movement’s 
ability to unionize home-based care workers, including a favor-
able political climate and a convergence of interests between 
workers and consumers. While not minimizing the relevance of 
these factors, this Part examines some of the practical chal-
lenges that labor has had to confront in order to secure labor 
law rights for home care workers and family child care provid-
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See GILLMAN, supra note 17, at i (“With the advent of welfare reform, 
family child care has been touted by policymakers and others as a cost-
effective way to . . . expand the child care supply in low-income communi-
ties.”). 
 47. See WIENER, supra note 11, at 11–12. 
 48. See Smith, supra note 5, at 337–38 (discussing the establishment of 
reimbursement rates for publicly subsidized family child care providers); Jo-
shua M. Wiener et al., Home and Community-Based Services in Seven States, 
23 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 89, 109 (2002) (discussing the problem of 
low reimbursement rates in home care). 
 49. WIENER, supra note 11, at 13 (“Consumer-directed care is often less 
expensive than agency-directed care because independent workers receive less 
supervision and fringe benefits and sometimes lower wages than agency-
directed employees.”). 
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ers. These challenges include an atomized workforce and the 
work’s location in individual homes. 
A. MOBILIZING THE WORKERS 
The invisibility of home-based care workers presents a 
first-order obstacle to organizing them. How does one effective-
ly organize workers whose jobs seem completely antithetical to 
any notion of collective action? Before workers can be orga-
nized, they must be identified and mobilized. In the traditional 
arena of manufacturing jobs, this first-order step was relatively 
straightforward—union organizers could stand at the factory 
gate and both identify and recruit workers as they entered or 
departed.50 This approach, however, has no utility when ap-
plied to home-based care workers. Not only are workers hidden 
in individual homes, but they are also fragmented throughout 
neighborhoods, towns, and cities.51 Instead of laboring together 
in central locations, home-based care workers most commonly 
work alone in private homes. Even more problematic for organ-
ization purposes, a home care worker frequently cares for sev-
eral clients,52 and thus works at several different “worksites.” 
Labor has responded to this challenge by employing strate-
gies to mobilize nontraditional workforces like home care work-
ers and family child care providers. These strategies include 
reaching out to workers by forging ties with groups and organi-
zations in their communities, using the media to reach workers, 
 
 50. See, e.g., James T. Barnett & Manuel H. Johnson, Private Sector Un-
ions in the Political Arena: Public Policy Versus Employee Preference, in WHAT 
ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT? 116, 119 (Richard Zeckhauser & Derek Leebaert 
eds., 1983) (“[O]rganizing workers at the factory gate is no longer as produc-
tive an activity as it was in the past.”); see also Peggie R. Smith, Organizing 
the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and Approaches to Em-
ployee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 45, 76 (2000) (“[T]he traditional model 
of organizing envisions a process whereby both the employer and the bargain-
ing unit are readily identifiable. In manufacturing jobs, organizers can often 
contact workers by standing in the factory owner’s parking lot or at the factory 
gate.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Barbara Rose, Local 880: Labor’s New Up-and-Comer, CHI. 
TRIB., July 5, 2005, at 1 (“Isolated and scattered in homes around the state, 
working on and off as their circumstances change, they are a high-turnover 
group that is hard to reach.”); Smith, supra note 5, at 340, 342 (discussing the 
difficulties that labor-organizing campaigns face trying to locate family child 
care providers and home care workers).  
 52. See, e.g., Jessica Toledano, Health Workers for Home-Bound to Vote on 
Union, L.A. BUS. J., Feb. 8, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 5466674 (describ-
ing the efforts of home care workers to unionize in California). 
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and holding rallies to vocalize issues of concern to workers.53 In 
addition, union organizers commonly go door-to-door to contact 
workers at their homes.54 Although extremely resource inten-
sive, these strategies have allowed labor to effectively mobilize 
home-based care workers.  
B. FOLLOWING THE MONEY: IDENTIFYING COMMONALITY FOR 
BARGAINING PURPOSES 
Together with figuring out how to mobilize home-based 
care workers, unions must solve the dilemma posed by the fact 
that many home-based care workers lack a traditional em-
ployment relationship with a common employer for bargaining 
purposes. As this Section demonstrates, unions have tackled 
this obstacle by taking advantage of the increasingly public 
quality of home-based care work. Before elaborating on this 
point, the discussion first outlines how the structure of home-
based care work impedes the formation of an employment rela-
tionship that can enable workers to engage in collective bar-
gaining.  
In the family child care industry, providers usually enter 
into individual contracts with the parents for whom they pro-
vide child care.55 If the law were to recognize an employment 
 
 53. See Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant 
Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 434 (1995) (describing the Workplace Project, a commu-
nity-based worker center in Long Island, N.Y., dedicated to organizing immi-
grant workers, and its use of Spanish-language media to inform immigrant 
workers of their rights); Victor Narro, Home Is Where the Union Is: Los An-
geles Domestic Workers Find Innovative Ways to Exercise Their Rights, THIRD 
FORCE, Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 18, 19 (discussing the Domestic Workers Associa-
tion and describing its use of public-service announcements on Los Angeles 
Spanish-language radio and television stations to recruit members); Immanuel 
Ness, Organizing Home Health-Care Workers, WORKINGUSA, Nov. 1999, at 
59, 73 (discussing the grassroots strategies that labor used to organize home 
health-care workers in New York including “public hearings, rank-and-file 
lobbying, polling, coalition building, rallies, organized press campaigns, and 
soliciting support from prominent leaders and public officials”). 
 54. See, e.g., Margarita Bauza, Service Union Raises Workers’ Pay, Hopes, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 2, 2007, at 1A (“The union sidestepped those hur-
dles by visiting people at home, collecting signatures and passing out leaf-
lets.”); Patrice M. Mareschal, Innovation and Adaptation: Contrasting Efforts 
to Organize Home Care Workers in Four States, LAB. STUD. J., Mar. 2006, at 
25, 32 (2006) (observing that in Oregon, SEIU gathered signatures in support 
of the initiative by “making house calls, engaging workers in political activism, 
and building coalitions with senior citizens and disabled persons”).  
 55. See Position Statement, Nat’l Ass’n for Family Child Care, Best Prac-
tices for Family Child Care Union Organizing 1 (2006), available at http:// 
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relationship in this context, it would be between the provider 
and each parent, and the relationship would appear to fall 
within the NLRA’s coverage.56 Because providers exercise con-
siderable control over how they perform their jobs,57 however, it 
is extremely unlikely that a provider-parent employment rela-
tionship exists. Instead, family child care providers generally 
operate as independent contractors and, as a result, they are 
outside the NLRA’s purview.58 Yet even if the law did regard 
the provider-parent relationship as an employment relation-
ship covered by the NLRA, considerable hurdles to unionization 
would remain. As an initial matter, a provider could not engage 
in collective bargaining unless she joined forces with other pro-
viders, which would be no easy task given that providers typi-
cally work alone. Assuming, however, that a group of providers 
did join forces, a fatal problem would still remain because the 
providers, as a group, lack an identifiable parent-employer with 
whom to bargain, since each provider works for many different 
parents.  
The difficulties in gaining employee status and in deter-
mining the employer for purposes of bargaining are absent in a 
center-based child care setting. In this context, where parents 
contract with the center to provide care and the center employs 
the workers, a union can readily identify both the bargaining 
 
www.nafcc.org/documents/NAFCCUnionBestPractices.pdf (“Family child care 
providers are self-employed business owners who contract directly with clients 
and set the terms and conditions for the enrollment of children in their child 
care homes, including the program’s tuition, fees and operating hours.”). 
 56. Although the NLRA excludes domestic service workers from its defini-
tion of employee, the exclusion does not apply to family child care providers. 
The NLRA’s domestic service exemption applies to anyone employed “in the 
domestic service of any family or person at his home.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) 
(2000) (emphasis added). This language does not apply to a family child care 
provider because the provider cares for children in her own residence and not 
in the home of the children. By contrast, the NLRA’s domestic service provi-
sion would seem to reach nannies as they work in the home of the person or 
family for whom they provide child care services.  
 57. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 1. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) and the courts apply general agency principles that ac-
cord significant weight to the level of control that a company exercises over the 
“manner and means” by which a worker performs her job to distinguish be-
tween employees and independent contractors. See Local 777, Democratic Un-
ion Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Control exer-
cised over the ‘manner and means of performance’ . . . is the identifying 
characteristic of an employer/employee relationship.”). 
 58. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“[The] term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . 
any individual having the status of an independent contractor.”). 
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unit (employees of the center), as well as the employer (the cen-
ter).  
The structure of home care lends itself to a comparable 
analysis. Most home care workers are employed by home care 
agencies and, similar to center-based child care workers in the 
family child care context, if employed by a private agency, they 
most likely possess rights under the NLRA.59 In this scenario, 
the identification of a bargaining unit and the employer with 
whom to bargain does not pose any particular hurdles.  
Obstacles, however, surface in the context of home care 
workers who are hired directly by individual clients and/or 
their family members. At first glance, because these indepen-
dent workers likely can establish an employment relationship 
with clients, it appears that they may fare better than family 
child care providers in terms of securing protection under the 
NLRA. Unlike family child care providers, who clearly lack an 
employment relationship with the parents of the children for 
whom they care, independent home care workers may well 
qualify as employees of their clients (and/or family members of 
the clients) given that the clients may exert considerable con-
trol over the manner in which the workers perform their jobs.60  
Yet even if such an employment relationship exists, it does 
not afford the worker protection under the NLRA. Like many 
labor and employment law statutes, the NLRA contains a do-
mestic-service provision that exempts from coverage anyone 
employed “in the domestic service of any family or person at his 
home” including home care workers.61 According to the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board, this exemption applies where the 
“employment [is] on an individual and personal basis.”62 As a 
 
 59. To be exact, agency employees likely possess rights under the NLRA if 
they work for private agencies, as the NLRA does not apply to public-sector 
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (excluding from the definition of “employer” all 
federal, state, and local government entities). 
 60. The hallmark of home care arrangements, whereby consumers direct 
their own care, is that they allow consumers “to have an employer/employee 
relationship with their individual service providers.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., IN-HOME SUPPORTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY AND 
DISABLED: A COMPARISON OF CLIENT-DIRECTED AND PROFESSIONAL MAN-
AGEMENT MODELS OF SERVICE DELIVERY, at iii (1999), available at http:// 
aspe.hhs.gov/pic/pdf/6173.pdf. 
 61. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); see also Smith, supra note 13, at 544 n.50 (listing 
statutes that have domestic-service exemptions attached). 
 62. 30 Sutton Place Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 n.6 (1979) (quoting Suc-
cess Village Apartments, Inc. v. Local 376, UAW, 397 A.2d 85, 87 (Conn. 
1978)). 
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result, home care workers in the employ of individual home-
owners lack coverage under the NLRA. Even assuming workers 
could overcome this exception, they, like family child care pro-
viders, lack an identifiable entity with which to bargain, as 
each worker may have several employers, and the workers 
would seldom have employers in common. 
Home-based care workers who provide publicly subsidized 
care have also tried to secure collective bargaining rights by 
claiming that they are employees of the government agencies 
that fund such care. Unfortunately, courts have rejected these 
claims and have ruled that publicly subsidized, home-based 
care workers have an independent contractor relationship with 
government funding agencies, not an employment relation-
ship.63 Despite these rulings, unions are focusing their organiz-
ing efforts on this group of workers. Because the workers are 
publicly funded, they share a point of commonality that unions 
hope to leverage. Since the government largely determines the 
compensation paid to workers and can best provide them with 
workplace benefits relative to individual consumers and/or 
their family members, the labor movement’s goal is to persuade 
states both to treat the workers as quasi-public-sector em-
ployees, and also to negotiate with their labor representative 
regarding the terms under which they provide publicly funded 
care. The next Part examines the main legal strategies that un-
ions have used to accomplish this objective. Given that the 
NLRA covers only private-sector employment,64 these strate-
gies occur outside of the context of the NLRA, and thus must 
take account of state and local public-sector labor relations sta-
tutes. 
III.  THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF LABOR 
CAMPAIGNS   
As the previous Section discussed, when it comes to public-
ly subsidized home-based care workers, labor law usually clas-
sifies their relationship with the state as that of independent 
contractors. Despite this legal status, such workers now possess 
labor rights, including collective bargaining rights, in several 
states. To date, the labor movement has campaigned success-
 
 63. See infra notes 70–73, 172–75 and accompanying text (discussing cas-
es that address the issue of whether publicly subsidized home-care workers 
are public employees or independent contractors). 
 64. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (excluding from the definition of “employer” all fed-
eral, state, and local government entities). 
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fully to extend labor law protections to publicly subsidized 
home care workers in at least nine states, including California, 
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin.65 Family child care has experienced an 
even greater flurry of organizing activity. In the last two years, 
the labor movement has secured labor rights for publicly subsi-
dized family child care providers in ten states: Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, Washington, and Wisconsin.66  
 
 65. For California, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.25(a) (West 
2007); for Illinois, see 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/3, 315/7 (West 2007); for 
Iowa, see Iowa Exec. Order No. 43, 28 Iowa Admin. Bull. 221 (July 4, 2005); 
for Massachusetts, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, §§ 28–33 (2006); for Michi-
gan, see Interlocal Agreement Between the Department of Community Health 
and the Tri-County Aging Consortium (June 10, 2004) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Michigan Interlocal Agreement], and MICH. DEP’T OF CMTY. 
HEALTH, BENEFICIARY ELIGIBILITY BULLETIN: HEALTH CARE ELIGIBILITY POL-
ICY 04-07 (2004), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/HCEP_ 
04-07_110034_7.pdf; for Ohio, see Ohio Exec. Order No. 2007-23S (July 17, 
2007), available at http://www.governor.ohio.gov/Portals/0/Executive% 
20Order%202007-23S.pdf; for Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 410.600–
.614 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); for Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 
74.39A.220–.300 (2006); and for Wisconsin, see Wisconsin Office of the Gover-
nor, Wisconsin Quality Home Care Commission, http://www.wisgov.state.wi 
.us/appointments_detail.asp?boardid=213 (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). 
 66. For Illinois, see 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-11(b-5) (West Supp. 
2006); for Iowa, see Iowa Exec. Order No. 45, 29 Iowa Admin. Bull. 370 (Jan. 
16, 2006), and Iowa Exec. Order No. 46, 29 Iowa Admin. Bull. 373 (Jan. 16, 
2006); for Kansas, see Kan. Exec. Order No. 07-21 (July 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.governor.ks.gov/executive/Orders/exec_order0721.htm; for Michi-
gan, see DEBORAH CHALFIE ET AL., GETTING ORGANIZED: UNIONIZING HOME-
BASED CHILD CARE PROVIDERS 18–19, 25 n.26, 31 n.176 (2007), available at 
www.nwlc.org/pdf/GettingOrganized2007.pdf (citing Interlocal Agreement Be-
tween the Michigan Department of Human Services and Mott Community 
College Creating the Michigan Home Based Child Care Council (July 27, 
2006), and Letter from Jennifer Granholm, Governor of Mich., to Marianne 
Udow, Dir., Dep’t of Human Servs., and M. Richard Shaink, President, Mott 
Cmty. Coll. (Sept. 1, 2006)); for New Jersey, see N.J. Exec. Order No. 23 (Sept. 
5, 2006), available at http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eojsc23.htm; for 
New York, see N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12 (May 8, 2007), available at http://www 
.ny.gov/governor/executive_orders/exeorders/12.pdf;  for  Oregon,  see OR. REV. 
STAT. § 657A.430 (2007); for Pennsylvania, see Pa. Exec. Order No. 2007-06 
(June 14, 2007), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt 
?open=512&objID=401&mode=2 (follow “Directives Management” hyperlink; 
then follow “Executive Orders” hyperlink; then follow “2007-06—Registered 
Family Child Care Providers” hyperlink) (requiring a state agency to “meet, 
confer and discuss with the exclusive representative” of registered family child 
care providers on issues of mutual concern), and Pa. Exec. Order No. 2007-07 
(June 14, 2007), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt 
?open=512&objID=401&mode=2 (follow “Directives Management” hyperlink; 
then follow “Executive Orders” hyperlink; then follow “2007-07—Subsidized 
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This extension of labor rights to independent home-based 
care workers often stems from state legislation, executive or-
ders issued by state governors, and the acts of municipalities. 
Antitrust law, however, could interfere with such rights, as it 
generally prohibits independent contractors from engaging in 
collective bargaining.67 Yet despite this general rule, under the 
state action doctrine, state regulation can immunize labor ac-
tivity from antitrust review.68 While the state action doctrine 
applies most clearly to state regulation, including legislation, it 
may also apply to regulation undertaken by governors in their 
executive capacity and by municipalities.69  
A. HOME CARE 
The home care campaign first achieved national attention 
in California, where SEIU, in its early attempts to procure la-
bor rights for publicly funded home care workers, focused on 
the judiciary as a means for reform. Specifically, the union 
tried to persuade the California courts to recognize publicly 
funded home care workers—who cared for elderly and disabled 
clients in the Los Angeles County—as employees of the county 
under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act,70 the California law go-
verning labor relations for local government employees.71 SEIU 
 
Child Care Providers Exempt From Certification or Regulation” hyperlink) 
(requiring a state agency to “meet, confer and discuss with the exclusive rep-
resentative” of exempt family child care providers on issues of mutual con-
cern); for Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.028 (2006 & Supp. 2008); 
and for Wisconsin, see Wis. Exec. Order No. 172 (Oct. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/journal_media_detail.asp?locid=19&prid=2359. 
 67. The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or con-
spiracy” that unreasonably restrains competition. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 
2006). Although antitrust law exempts labor organizations, the exemption ex-
tends only to the organization of employees, not independent contractors. See 
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 17 (2000)) (immunizing labor organization activities designed to carry out 
the “legitimate” purposes of labor unions from liability under antitrust laws); 
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“[The] term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any indi-
vidual having the status of an independent contractor.”). 
 68. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); see also PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 215–216 (3d ed. 2006) 
(explaining “state action” immunity). 
 69. See C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the Clear Articulation Re-
quirement for State Action Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41 
B.C. L. REV. 1059, 1059–60 (2000); Jim Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judi-
cial Intervention in Constitutional and Antitrust Federalism, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
521, 548 (2005). 
 70. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3500–3511 (West 1995 & Supp. 2008).  
 71. See Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 434 v. County of L.A., 275 Cal. 
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argued that the county, as the workers’ employer, was obli-
gated to negotiate with it as a representative of the county’s 
home care workers.72  
The court disagreed with this theory, holding that the 
workers were employed not by the county, but by the individual 
recipients of the workers’ services.73 In response to this judicial 
defeat, SEIU redirected its efforts to the legislative process, 
where it met success. In 1992, the California legislature passed 
a law that authorized, and later required, each county in the 
state to create “public authorities,” agencies that would serve 
as the legal employer for home care workers for purposes of lo-
cal collective bargaining laws.74 Los Angeles County established 
a public authority in 1997,75 and two years later SEIU won the 
right to represent the county’s 74,000 home care workers.76  
Hoping to follow in California’s footsteps, the Oregon Pub-
lic Employees Union (OPEU), an SEIU affiliate, supported a 
bill introduced in the Oregon legislature in 1999 that would 
have provided for the establishment of a statewide home care 
commission, and that would have given publicly funded home 
care workers in the state the ability to unionize.77 When the bill 
died in the legislature,78 OPEU switched tactics and successful-
ly placed Measure 99 on the 2000 ballot.79 The measure, which 
garnered the approval of sixty-three percent of the voters,80 
amended the Oregon Constitution to create a Home Care 
Commission. It serves as the workers’ employer of record for 
purposes of collective bargaining81 and enables the workers to 
 
Rptr. 508, 510 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 511. 
 74. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.25(a) (West 2001); see also JA-
NET HEINRITZ-CANTERBURY, PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., COLLA-
BORATING TO IMPROVE IN-HOME SUPPORTIVE SERVICES 4–6 (2002), 
http://www.paraprofessional.org/publications/CA PA Report.pdf (stating that 
the organization and progress of California’s In-Home Supportive Services 
Program created public authorities). 
 75. See Delp & Quan, supra note 3, at 11. 
 76. See Schneider, supra note 4, at 26. 
 77. See Mareschal, supra note 54, at 32. 
 78. See id.; Erin Hoover Barnett, Caregivers’ Measure on Ballot, OREGO-
NIAN, July 22, 2000, at D1. 
 79. See Erin Hoover Barnett, State Strives to Improve Home Care, ORE-
GONIAN, Aug. 2, 2001, at D11. 
 80. See Mareschal, supra note 54, at 33. 
 81. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 11(3)(f ) (“For purposes of collective bargaining, 
the Commission shall be the employer of record of home-care workers hired 
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unionize.82 In addition, the workers are regarded as public em-
ployees of the state and thus subject to Oregon’s Public Em-
ployee Collective Bargaining Act.83 In 2001, the workers voted 
to have SEIU represent them.84 
The approach to unionization of publicly funded home care 
workers in Washington followed a trajectory similar to that in 
Oregon. In 2001, legislators considered a bill that would have 
provided labor rights to home-based care workers through a 
public authority model comparable to those established in Cali-
fornia and Oregon.85 When the bill languished in committee, its 
proponents turned to a ballot initiative, known as the Home-
care Quality Initiative.86 Approximately sixty-two percent of 
Washington voters approved the initiative, which established a 
Home Care Quality Authority and granted collective bargain-
ing rights to publicly subsidized home care workers.87 During 
the 2002 legislative session, the legislature codified the text of 
the initiative.88 The law names the authority as the employer of 
record for the workers for purposes of collective bargaining.89 
Both Michigan and Wisconsin also use a public-authority 
model to recognize union representatives of publicly funded 
home care workers. These states’ public authorities, however, 
were created not by legislation or executive order, but by inter-
governmental cooperation agreements.90 Such agreements ena-
 
directly by the client and paid by the State, or by a county or other public 
agency which receives money for that purpose from the State.”). 
 82. See id. art. XV, § 11. 
 83. See Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 
123 P.3d 300, 303 (Or. 2005). 
 84. See Dave Hogan, In-Home Care Workers Vote for Union Backing, 
SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Dec. 16, 2001, at C10; Schneider, supra note 4, at 25.  
 85. See S. 5652, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001); H.B. 1576, 57th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001). 
 86. See 2002 Wash. Initiative 775, available at http://www.secstate.wa 
.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i775.pdf; Mareschal, supra note 54, at 35. 
 87. See Mareschal, supra note 54, at 35. 
 88. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 74.39A.220–.290 (2006).  
 89. See id. § 74.39A.270(1); Wash. State–Office of Fin. Mgmt. v. Serv. Em-
ployees Int’l Union, Local 775, No. 18805-U-04-4777, 2005 WA PERC LEXIS 
141, at *2 (Wash. Public Employment Relations Commission Oct. 12, 2005) 
(noting that in 2004, the legislature amended the law “to shift the responsibili-
ty for bargaining on behalf of the employer from the [authority] to the Gover-
nor or the Governor’s designee”).  
 90. For a broad overview of such agreements, see THOMAS S. KURTZ, IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION HANDBOOK 8, 9, 13 (2006), available at 
http://www.newpa.com/download.aspx?id=45 (describing forms of cooperation 
among municipal governments in Pennsylvania, including intergovernmental 
cooperation agreements). See also Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Coop-
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ble local governments to join together to address shared prob-
lems or to provide coordinated services.91 In the home care 
text, the agreements allow local governments to work together 
to improve the delivery and the quality of subsidized home care 
on behalf of consumers. In addition, the agreements enable 
cal governments to jointly facilitate the workplace interests of 
workers by designating an employer of record on behalf of the 
workers for bargaining purposes.  
In Michigan, an intergovernmental agreement signed by 
the Michigan Department of Community Health and the Tri-
County Aging Consortium established the Michigan Quality 
Community Care Council in 2004.92 The agreement tasks the 
council with facilitating the provision of “employer-related 
functions” for publicly subsidized home care providers and 
promoting an effective home care system on behalf of consum-
ers.93 Under the agreement, the council also has “the right to 
bargain collectively and enter into agreements with labor or-
ganizations.”94 In 2005, more than 41,000 publicly subsidized 
home care workers in the state took the first step toward collec-
tive bargaining when they voted to elect SEIU as their repre-
sentative in negotiations with the council.95  
In Wisconsin, an intergovernmental cooperation agreement 
was used to establish a public authority known as the Quality 
Home Care Commission (QHCC),96 which has the power to bar-
gain collectively with labor organizations that represent public-
ly subsidized home care workers.97 Whereas the council in 
 
eration, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 
122–23 (2003) (stating that intergovernmental cooperative agreements can be 
characterized as “contracts for services; joint provisions of services; and the 
creation of a new unit of government”). 
 91. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 90, at 99. 
 92. See Michigan Interlocal Agreement, supra note 65, at 2.  
 93. See id. § 2.01 (stating that one purpose of the agreement is to “facili-
tate in the provision of certain employer-related functions for home and com-
munity care Providers”). 
 94. Id. § 6.11. 
 95. Sharon Terlep, Unions Recruit Health Workers, DETROIT NEWS & 
FREE PRESS, Feb. 26, 2006, at 1D. 
 96. See Wisconsin Quality Home Care Commission, supra note 65. The 
power to enter into such agreements is derived from WIS. STAT. § 66.0301 
(2005). The statute provides that municipalities may contract with each other 
for the “furnishing of services or the joint exercise of any power or duty re-
quired or authorized by law.” Id. § 66.0301(2). 
 97. Cf. JOINT COMM. ON FIN., LEGIS. FISCAL BUREAU, QUALITY HOME 
CARE COMMISSION (DHFS–DISABILITY AND ELDER SERVICES) 3–5 (2007), 
available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/2007-09budget/Budget%20Papers/ 
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Michigan is statewide, Wisconsin has adopted a county ap-
proach similar to that utilized in California.98 The Wisconsin 
agreement allows the state to contract with individual counties 
regarding the provision of publicly funded home care services.99 
While each county will continue to finance home care within its 
boundaries, the QHCC will serve as an employer of record for 
home care workers in the counties.100  
Although the extension of labor rights to home care work-
ers in Michigan and Wisconsin originates from intergovern-
mental cooperation agreements, as opposed to state legislative 
acts, the relevance of this difference to the workers seems in-
significant from a practical standpoint. The workers in Michi-
gan and Wisconsin, similar to those in California, Oregon, and 
Washington, now have the ability to vote for a union represent-
ative and the right to have a government agency recognize that 
representative for purposes of collective bargaining. There is, 
however, a legal difference for purposes of antitrust law be-
tween the use of state legislation and intergovernmental coop-
eration agreements.101 As one scholar explains, “the acts of a 
state legislature . . . are ipso facto immune without further in-
quiry, [while] the acts of municipalities and other subordinate 
governmental entities are immune only if undertaken pursuant 
to a clearly articulated state policy.”102  
 
436.pdf (noting that the Commission is funded through the Service Employees 
International Union). 
 98. Minutes of the Health & Human Needs Committee, Human Services 
Board & Long Term Support 2 (Aug. 1, 2006) (recorded by Dawn MacFarlane), 
available at http://www.co.dane.wi.us/pdfdocs/minutes/hn20060801.pdf (“Mich-
igan’s Council is statewide, but our proposal is to start with Dane County and 
then add from there.”). 
 99. Cf. id. at 1 (noting that the QHCC is governed by a resolution between 
Dane County and the State of Wisconsin). 
 100. So far, only Dane County has entered into an agreement with the 
state to form a QHCC, and as of yet, the workers have not voted to join a un-
ion. See JOINT COMM. ON FIN., supra note 97, at 4. 
 101. See, e.g., Floyd, supra note 69, at 1063 (“Absent any definitive guid-
ance from the Supreme Court, lower courts generally have assumed that state 
agencies should be treated like municipalities and other subordinate govern-
mental units and that federal antitrust immunity should be accorded to their 
programs only if they are adopted pursuant to a clearly articulated policy 
adopted by the state legislature or the state supreme court acting in a legisla-
tive capacity.”). 
 102. Id. at 1059–60 (“The Court has explained that because municipalities 
are not themselves sovereign, the clear articulation requirement is necessary 
to ensure that their acts truly represent the sovereign policy of the state it-
self.”). 
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Because Michigan and Wisconsin rely on the acts of local 
governmental entities to extend labor rights to home-based 
care workers, the question arises as to whether those acts are 
immune from antitrust review. The acts will qualify for immun-
ity “as long as a state confers permissive authority in general 
terms for a municipality to deal with a matter within the mu-
nicipal government’s discretion.”103 The intergovernmental co-
operation agreements in Michigan and Wisconsin should readi-
ly satisfy this test given that both states authorize local 
governmental entities to address issues related to publicly sub-
sidized home care.104  
In a few states, including Illinois and Iowa, the labor 
movement was successful in persuading state governors to take 
action to extend labor law protections to publicly funded home 
care workers.105 In Illinois, where low wages and a lack of bene-
fits have long plagued home care workers,106 SEIU Local 880 
 
 103. Rossi, supra note 69, at 548 (observing that the Supreme Court ac-
tually “abandoned the clear-articulation requirement in assessing municipal 
state-action immunity” and explaining that the Court made “state delegation 
to a municipal government” sufficient to “meet” the clear-articulation test). 
 104. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 124.501–.512 (West 2006); see also WIS. 
STAT. § 49.45(2)(a)(3) (2005) (providing that the Department of Health and 
Family Services may delegate to a county department the task of determining 
individual eligibility for various social services, including home health servic-
es, under section 49.46).  
 105. This approach also proved effective in Ohio. In July, 2007, the Gover-
nor of Ohio, Ted Strickland, signed an executive order that states that 
“[a]lthough [publicly funded home care workers] are not State employees, the 
State . . . shall engage in collective bargaining with the elected representative 
of the [workers].” Ohio Exec. Order No. 2007-23S, supra note 65, § 6. But see 
Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, to William 
J. Seitz, Ohio State Senator (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2008/02/V080001homecare.pdf (stating that Ohio Exec. Order No. 2007-23-
S is likely to result in “certain anticompetitive conduct that is inconsistent 
with federal antitrust law and policy”). The letter was issued by the Federal 
Trade Commission’s Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Competition, and Bu-
reau of Economics in response to a request by Ohio Senator William J. Seitz. 
Id. The Commission voted 4-1 to authorize issuance of the comments. See 
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Submits Comments on Estab-
lishing Collective Bargaining for Independent Home Care Providers in Ohio 
(Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/inhomecare.shtm. 
Commissioner Jon Leibowitz voted against issuance of the comments and is-
sued a dissenting statement. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jon 
Leibowitz in re Ohio Executive Order 2007-23S, Matter Number V080001 
(2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/02/ 
V080001dissentingstatementleibowitz.pdf. 
 106. See, e.g., Jefferson Robbins, Home Care Providers Seek Raises; State 
Pay Is Only $5 Per Hour, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Mar. 11, 1996, at 7; 
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garnered bargaining rights for the workers in 2003, following 
the election of the state’s first Democratic governor in almost 
twenty years, Rod Blagojevich.107 That year, Governor Blagoje-
vich signed an executive order that requires the state to “rec-
ognize a representative designated by a majority of [the work-
ers] as the[ir] exclusive representative” and to “engage in 
collective negotiations with said representative concerning all 
terms and conditions” of the workers’ employment.108 In 2005, 
the Illinois legislature codified the provisions of the executive 
order in the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.109 
The then-Governor of Iowa, Tom Vilsack, followed the lead 
of Governor Blagojevich when, in 2005, he signed an executive 
order that required a state agency to “meet and confer with the 
authorized representative of the individual [home care] provid-
ers, as designated by the majority of the individual provid-
ers.”110 Iowa’s approach in granting individual home care work-
ers a voice in shaping their labor arrangements with the state 
merits two key observations. First, meet-and-confer provisions, 
of the type contained in the Iowa executive order, typically pos-
sess less bite than collective bargaining provisions.111 As ex-
plained by one commentator, “[i]nstead of serving as a satisfac-
tory mechanism for dispute resolution, [meet-and-confer] 
statutes often cause greater frustrations in that they only re-
quire the employer to consider plans or proposals presented by 
the employee representative, rather than to engage in good 
faith collective bargaining.”112  
While it remains unclear whether Iowa’s meet-and-confer 
executive order will eventually result in frustration,113 it is 
 
Brenda Warner Rotzoll, Half of State Home Health Workers Uninsured, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at 21. 
 107. Christopher Hayes, Healthcare Workers Win Raises, IN THESE TIMES, 
Feb. 16, 2004, at 26. 
 108. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2005-1, 29 Ill. Reg. 3386 (Feb. 18, 2005). 
 109. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/3(f ), (n), (o) (West 2005 & Supp. 
2007). 
 110. Iowa Exec. Order No. 43, supra note 65, ¶ 1. 
 111. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the 
Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885, 896–99 (1973); David M. Rabban, Can 
American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Em-
ployees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 709–10 (1990). 
 112. Robert B. Moberly, Public Sector Labor Relations Law in Tennessee: 
The Current Inadequacies and the Available Alternatives, 42 TENN. L. REV. 
235, 258 (1975). 
 113. Despite the meet-and-confer nature of the executive order, AFSCME, 
the elected representative of the workers, entered into a “Memorandum of Un-
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worth noting that the protections home care workers receive 
under the order fall short of the collective bargaining rights 
given to state and local government employees by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act.114 For example, the Act 
grants public employees the right to “[n]egotiate collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing” and the right to 
“[e]ngage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”115 The ex-
ecutive order, in contrast, extends none of these rights to home 
care workers. Instead, it simply provides for a meet-and-confer 
process with an authorized representative of the workers.116  
The second noteworthy observation about the executive or-
der is that, contrary to the course of events in Illinois, the Iowa 
legislature has not codified the order’s provisions into state law. 
The failure to do so leaves the workers vulnerable, as the order 
“can be overturned at any time by the authorizing Governor, a 
future governor, or the legislature.”117 As Michael Herman 
points out, “when a new Governor comes into office, she [usual-
ly] issues an executive order rescinding the orders of previous 
Governors.”118 By contrast, it is far more difficult to repeal an 
enactment of a state legislature, making legislation a more ef-
fective means of guaranteeing labor rights to home care work-
ers than an executive order alone.  
While states have taken various approaches in response to 
the labor movement’s attempts to gain labor rights for home 
care workers, a key theme emerges from the unionization of 
publicly subsidized home care workers: the creation of public 
authorities. These public authorities serve not only as employ-
ers of record for the workers, but also as entities entrusted with 
ensuring the quality of home care services. The public authori-
ty structure in Oregon—the Home Care Commission119—is typ-
ical in this respect. By law, a majority of the Commission’s 
 
derstanding” with the State in December 2006. The Memorandum provides for 
a three percent raise for the workers. See Memorandum of Understanding Be-
tween Iowa Department of Human Services and the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees, Iowa Public Employees Council 61, 
AFL-CIO (AFSCME) 1 (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.ime.state.ia.us/ 
docs/CDAC-MemorandumOfUnderstanding.pdf. 
 114. See IOWA CODE §§ 20.1–.31 (2001). 
 115. See id. § 20.8. 
 116. See Iowa Exec. Order No. 43, supra note 65, ¶ 1. 
 117. See Michael S. Herman, Gubernatorial Executive Orders, 30 RUTGERS 
L.J. 987, 990 (1999). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See OR. CONST. art. XV, § 11(2)(a). 
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board members are consumers.120 The board is responsible for 
ensuring high-quality care for consumers, providing training 
opportunities for workers, establishing worker qualifications, 
and maintaining a registry of qualified workers for the benefit 
of consumers searching for caregivers.121 This strong emphasis 
on consumer protection, combined with the focus on empower-
ing workers, underscores the labor movement’s recognition that 
the interests of consumers and workers are inextricably linked. 
When workers are treated with respect and compensated with 
a living wage, they are more likely to invest in their jobs and to 
provide quality care. 
Thus far, unionization has created tangible benefits that 
have improved the economic status of publicly subsidized home 
care workers. Those benefits include wage increases of close to 
twenty percent for workers in Michigan,122 and thirty-four per-
cent for workers in Illinois.123 In Oregon, collective bargaining 
has gained workers wage increases, health benefits, and paid 
leave, as well as coverage under the state’s workers’ compensa-
tion statute.124 Likewise, in Washington, the union contract 
with the state includes wage increases, health care coverage, 
dental and vision benefits, workers’ compensation coverage, 
and vacation benefits.125 
While the labor movement has been largely successful in 
winning the right to represent independent home care workers, 
it has experienced roadblocks. The most publicized setback oc-
 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. art. XV, § 11(1)(b).  
 122. See Cynthia Estlund et al., New Ways of Governing the Workplace: 
Proceedings of the 2007 Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools 
Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 111, 131 (2007). 
 123. See SERV. EMPLOYEES INT’L UNION, HEALTH CARE DIV., BUILDING A 
NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 3 (2004), http://www 
.seiu1984.org/appResources/scDocs/HealthDivision.Rpt.pdf; Joan Fitzgerald, 
Getting Serious About Good Jobs, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 2006, at 33, 35. 
 124. See, e.g., Mareschal, supra note 54, at 32–34 (“It provided for a pay 
increase of almost 10 percent, health insurance, workers’ compensation, and 
paid time off.”); SERV. EMPLOYEES INT’L UNION, supra note 123, at 3; SERV. 
EMPLOYEES INT’L UNION, WORKING TOGETHER FOR QUALITY PERSONAL CARE 
5 (2005), http://s67.advocateoffice.com/vertical/sites/%7ba168c1b2-e6e9-4583 
-8bd1-9f21d62ca0c4%7d/uploads/%7b94c40e53-4fd4-47d2-aabf-71a33e87a66f% 
7d.pdf. 
 125. See Collective Bargaining Agreement by and Between the State of 
Washington and Service Employees International Union 775, at 18–23 (2007), 
available at http://www.hcqa.wa.gov/Collective_Barg/coll_barg_docs/SEIU_ 
2007-2009.pdf. 
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curred in New Jersey. In 2003, a bill known as the Quality 
Home Care Act was introduced in both Houses of the New Jer-
sey legislature.126 The bill proposed the creation of several 
home care councils to operate publicly funded home care in the 
state.127 The bill, which provided a ten-dollar-per-hour mini-
mum wage for workers, designated the councils as the employ-
ers of the workers and gave workers collective bargaining 
rights.128 In the face of considerable opposition, the bill ulti-
mately died in committee.129 The bill’s demise, argues Patrice 
Mareschal, demonstrates the influence of the strong for-profit 
home care market in New Jersey.130 Contrary to most other 
states, where SEIU has organized home care workers, New 
Jersey relies on for-profit agencies to deliver the overwhelming 
bulk of publicly subsidized home care.131 The bill would have 
allowed each council to control all publicly funded home care in 
its region, effectively restricting for-profit agencies to serving 
only private-pay consumers.132 Not surprisingly, much of the 
opposition to the bill originated with for-profit agencies that 
had an obvious financial incentive to maintain the status 
quo.133 As Mareschal suggests, the New Jersey defeat high-
lights the need for unions to think strategically about how best 
to counter “the storm of business political activity”134 in those 
states with politically influential for-profit home care agencies.  
 
 126. See Assemb. 3778, 2002 Leg., 210th Sess. (N.J. 2003). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Patrice M. Mareschal, Agitation and Control: A Tactical Analysis 
of the Campaign Against New Jersey’s Quality Home Care Act 21 (n.d.) (un-
published manuscript, available at http://depts.washington.edu/pcls/ 
caringlaborconference/Mareschalpaper.pdf ); see also Angela Stewart, Proposed 
New Home Health Aide Rules Spur Arguments, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), 
June 24, 2003 (“[T]he workers now make an average hourly wage of $8.79.”). 
 129. See Mareschal, supra note 128, at 19–20. 
 130. Id. at 21–23. 
 131. See id. at 17. 
 132. See id. at 20. 
 133. See id. at 21–23; see also Joseph Maddaloni Jr., Bureaucratic Night-
mare in the Making: Scrap McGreevey Proposal for a Public Authority to Over-
see Home Health Care Services, 172 N.J. L.J. 1027, 1027 (2003) (arguing that 
the Act failed to recognize the role that private home care agencies play in 
providing quality training for their home health workers). But see Arnold Shep 
Cohen, The Case for Oversight of Home Health Care: A Public Authority Is 
Needed for an Industry Plagued by Staff Turnover Problems and Inadequate 
Care, 173 N.J. L.J. 95, 95 (2003) (arguing that the Act will “vastly improve the 
delivery of personal care assistant services in New Jersey”). 
 134. Mareschal, supra note 128, at 24. 
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B. FAMILY CHILD CARE  
As Section A suggested, in the context of home care, states 
have responded to labor advocates in a variety of ways. In con-
trast, states have taken a much more uniform approach in the 
family child care context: they have relied overwhelmingly on 
executive orders to grant labor law rights to family child care 
providers. Of the ten states that presently have a process in 
place to recognize family child care unions, the governors in 
nine of those states signed executive orders mandating the 
process.135 Illinois was the first state to bring publicly subsi-
dized family child care providers into the scope of its labor 
laws, doing so in 2005 pursuant to an executive order.136 The 
order, which mirrors an earlier order signed on behalf of home 
care workers in Illinois, requires the state to “recognize a rep-
resentative designated by a majority of [the providers] . . . as 
the[ir] exclusive representative.”137 It also grants the “repre-
sentative the same rights and duties granted to employee rep-
resentatives by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.”138 Lat-
er that year, the Illinois legislature codified the order,139 
providing the workers with even stronger rights than those ex-
pressed in the order. Notably, the law states in clear terms that 
the providers are deemed state employees for the purpose of the 
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act,140 and adds that the state 
“shall engage in collective bargaining” with their representa-
tive.141 
Washington followed closely behind Illinois in granting au-
thority for the state’s publicly subsidized family child care pro-
viders to engage in collective bargaining with the state. In Sep-
tember 2005, Governor Christine Gregoire sent an executive 
directive to the Secretary of the State Department of Social and 
Health Services (DSHS), directing DSHS “to define a process 
for family child care providers . . . to have a strong, ongoing 
voice” in matters related to their working conditions.142 The let-
 
 135. The exception is Michigan, which uses an interlocal agreement to 
grant collective bargaining rights to publicly subsidized family child care pro-
viders. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 66, at 18–19.  
 136. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2005-1, supra note 108. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-11(b-5) (West 2007). 
 140. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/3(n). 
 141. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-11(b-5). 
 142. Letter from Christine O. Gregoire, Governor, State of Wash., to Robin 
Arnold-Williams, Secretary, Dep’t of Soc. and Health Serv., State of Wash. 
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ter also specified that the providers should have a chance to 
“select a representative for negotiations on their behalf with 
DSHS,” and that DSHS should meet with the representative to 
discuss matters such as “reimbursement rates, regulation, and 
licensing procedures.”143 Shortly thereafter, the workers se-
lected SEIU as their representative.144 In 2006, the legislature 
codified the directive and strengthened its essential points. 
Under the law, providers are state employees who are entitled 
to representation for the purpose of “collective bargaining.”145 
The law also designates the governor or a designee as the pro-
viders’ employer of record.146 
In 2005, AFSCME Council 75 presented union authoriza-
tion cards to the Oregon Employment Relations Board (OERB) 
requesting permission to represent certified and registered 
family child care providers in Oregon.147 The following year, 
SEIU Local 503 submitted union authorization cards to the 
OERB requesting to represent subsidized, license-exempt fami-
ly child care providers in the state.148 In both instances, OERB 
certified the cards, following which Oregon’s governor, Theo-
dore Kulongoski, issued executive orders directing state agen-
cies to meet and confer with the relevant union officials on be-
half of the providers “regarding issues of mutual concern.”149 In 
2007, the Oregon legislature codified the provisions of both ex-
ecutive orders, but replaced the executive orders’ “meet-and-
confer” approach with a much stronger “collective bargaining” 
process.150 The legislation provides that the state will serve as 
 
(Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/execorders/dir_05_ 
09_16-2.pdf. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Paul Nyhan, Child Care Operators to Join Union with Vote, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 22, 2005, at B1. 
 145. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.028 (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
 146. Id. § 41.56.028(2). 
 147. Or. Exec. Order No. 05-10, 44-11 Or. Bull. 4 (Sept. 23, 2005). 
 148. Or. Exec. Order No. 06-04, 45-3 Or. Bull. 6 (Feb. 13, 2006). 
 149. Or. Exec. Order No. 06-04, supra note 148, at 2; Or. Exec. Order No. 
05-10, supra note 147, at 2; see also Or. Exec. Order No. 07-03, 46-3 Or. Bull. 6 
(Feb. 1, 2007) (requiring state agencies to “engage in collective negotiations 
and attempt to reach an agreement with [the unions], on behalf of their re-
spective segments of the family child care provider population” during the pe-
riod from 2009 to 2011).  
 150. OR. REV. STAT. § 657A.430(3) (2007) (stating that family child care 
providers “have the right to form, join and participate in the activities of labor 
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation and col-
lective bargaining on matters concerning labor relations”). 
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the public employer of record for the providers,151 and treats 
the providers as public employees for the sole purpose of “col-
lective bargaining.”152 
The executive orders and subsequent statutes in Illinois, 
Washington, and Oregon comprise an approach that emphati-
cally extends to publicly subsidized family child care providers 
state labor law protection in the form of collective bargaining 
rights. Iowa and Wisconsin, by comparison, permit the unioni-
zation of providers, but are far more restrictive in terms of the 
actual rights given to the providers.153 In 2006, Iowa’s governor 
signed executive orders regarding both registered family child 
care providers154 and license-exempt providers of subsidized 
child care.155 The orders provide that state agencies “shall meet 
and confer with the authorized representative” of the provid-
ers,156 and that in doing so, the agencies “shall discuss issues of 
mutual concern, including training requirements, reimburse-
ment rates, payment procedures, [and] health and safety condi-
tions.”157 Although AFSCME has since won a union election, 
giving it the right to represent registered providers in Iowa,158 
the executive orders suffer from the same limitations discussed 
earlier in the context of the Iowa executive order for indepen-
dent home care workers:159 the orders grant the providers only 
meet-and-confer rights and do not treat the providers as state 
employees for any purpose. Finally, because the legislature has 
not codified the orders’ provisions, any subsequent governor or 
legislature can eliminate these rights with the stroke of a pen. 
 
 151. Id. § 657A.430(2) (“For purposes of collective bargaining . . . the State 
of Oregon is the public employer of record of family child care providers.”).  
 152. Id. § 657A.430(4) (“[F]amily child care providers are not for any other 
purpose employees of the State of Oregon or any other public body.”). 
 153. Publicly subsidized family child care providers in Kansas and Penn-
sylvania also recently received the right to unionize as a result of executive 
orders that reflect a meet-and-confer approach. See Kan. Exec. Order No. 07-
21, supra note 66; Pa. Exec. Order No. 2007-07, supra note 66; Pa. Exec. Order 
No. 2007-06, supra note 66. 
 154. See Iowa Exec. Order No. 45, supra note 66. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Iowa Exec. Order No. 46, supra note 66, ¶ 1; Iowa Exec. Order No. 
45, supra note 66, ¶ 1. 
 157. Iowa Exec. Order No. 46, supra note 66, ¶ 2; Iowa Exec. Order No. 45, 
supra note 66, ¶ 2. 
 158. See Clyde Weiss, Standing Up and Speaking Out, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, 
Jan./Feb. 2007, at 26, 26. 
 159. See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text. 
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The union status of family child care providers in Wiscon-
sin is somewhat comparable to that of Iowa. In 2006, Wisconsin 
Governor Jim Doyle signed an executive order that takes the 
form of a meet-and-confer requirement.160 The order requires 
the Department of Health and Family Services “to meet and 
confer with a recognized exclusive majority representative of 
family child care providers in Wisconsin” for the purpose of dis-
cussing various issues including “reimbursement and payment 
procedures,” as well as training.161 The providers have since 
voted to have AFSCME as their representative.162 However, as 
is true of the Iowa order, the Wisconsin order has not been codi-
fied by the legislature, and the order does not regard the work-
ers as state employees for any purpose.163 
The legal approaches used by the states to extend labor 
rights to family child care providers all rely on establishing an 
employer of record, as is also true with the unionization of 
home care workers. Yet the unionization of family child care 
providers differs in one notable respect from the unionization of 
home care workers: the latter incorporates public authorities 
that are responsible for ensuring quality of services. The ab-
sence of such authorities in the context of family child care un-
ionization raises an interesting observation. Although concerns 
about caregiving quality characterize both the home care and 
family child care campaigns, this issue seems to be most pro-
nounced in the former context. The relative importance of care-
giving quality in the home care campaigns may stem from the 
fact that home care consumers and their advocates appear to be 
much more vocal and organized in their demands for improved 
quality compared with parents who qualify for publicly subsi-
dized family child care.164 One possible explanation for this dis-
tinction is that home care consumers are also the recipients of 
such care. By contrast, parents who use family child care may 
be less informed about the quality of care their children receive 
given that the care occurs in their absence.165  
 
 160. See Wis. Exec. Order No. 172, supra note 66. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Judith Davidoff, Union of Caring: AFSCME Gives Licensed Child Care 
Providers a New Voice, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Dec. 9–10, 2006, at 
A1. 
 163. Wis. Exec. Order No. 172, supra note 66 (“Family child care providers 
are not employees or agents of the State.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Delp & Quan, supra note 3, at 11–13 (discussing the in-
volvement of consumer groups in the home care campaign in Los Angeles). 
 165. But see, e.g., Andrew I. Batavia, The Growing Prominence of Indepen-
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At present, it appears that while ten states have extended 
labor rights to publicly subsidized family child care providers, 
only three states have contracts in effect covering the provid-
ers: Illinois, Oregon, and Washington.166 The Illinois contract 
mandates reimbursement rate increases between thirty-five 
and forty-nine percent over three years,167 access to affordable 
health care, and incentives for providers to acquire training in 
early education.168 In Oregon, where both AFSCME and SEIU 
represent publicly subsidized providers, the unions signed con-
tracts that provide for substantial increases in reimbursement 
rates and a reduction in the time required to process payments 
to providers.169 The Washington contract likewise requires in-
creases in subsidy payments to providers. It also includes train-
ing subsidies for providers and a commitment to create an af-
fordable health insurance plan.170  
Despite these benefits, the union campaigns on behalf of 
publicly subsidized family child care providers have not met 
with uniform success. The remainder of this Section discusses 
the promise and ultimate pitfalls experienced by publicly sub-
sidized family child care providers in Rhode Island and Mary-
 
dent Living and Consumer Direction as Principles in Long-Term Care: A Con-
tent Analysis and Implications for Elderly People with Disabilities, 10 ELDER 
L.J. 263, 265–66 (2002) (noting that the demand for access to quality, publicly 
subsidized consumer-directed home care began in the 1970s as part of the dis-
ability-rights and independent-living movements); Nancy Folbre, Demanding 
Quality: Worker/Consumer Coalitions and “High Road” Strategies in the Care 
Sector, 34 POL. & SOC. 8, 11, 12 (2006) (noting that quality of care is generally 
difficult to gauge in all contexts); Charles P. Sabatino & Simi Litvak, Liability 
Issues Affecting Consumer-Directed Personal Assistance Services—Report and 
Recommendations, 4 ELDER L.J. 247, 254 (1996); Heather Young & Suzanne 
Sikma, Self-Directed Care: An Evaluation, 4 POL’Y POL. & NURSING PRAC. 185, 
185 (2003).  
 166. See Anne Ravana, Maine Child Care Providers Set to Form Union, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Me.), Oct. 22, 2007, at B1. 
 167. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 4. 
 168. Press Release, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 49,000 Family Child Care 
Providers Negotiate Historic Contract in IL to Raise Standards for Quality 
Child Care Services (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.seiu.org/media/ 
pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1275. 
 169. See Oregon AFSCME, AFSCME, State Sign Landmark Child Care 
Providers Contract, OREGONAFSCME.COM, Oct. 4, 2006, http://www 
.oregonafscme.com/index.cfm?zone=/unionactive/view_article.cfm&HomeID= 
44358; SEIU Local 503, Child Care Agreement Reached: Agreement Makes 
Care More Accessible, Affordable, SEIU503.ORG, Dec. 8, 2006, http://www 
.seiu503.org/care/child/Child_Care_Agreement_Reached.aspx. 
 170. See Family Child Care Contract, Contract for WA Family Child Care 
Providers 2007–2009, available at http://seiu925.wtf.localsonline.org/Early_ 
Learning/FCCP_Contract/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). 
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land. These two states highlight very divergent approaches to 
the representation of family child care providers and usefully 
illustrate the range of obstacles that unions face as they try to 
improve providers’ economic status.  
Rhode Island is one of three states where the legislature 
approved a measure granting providers some level of represen-
tational rights only to have the governor veto the legislation.171 
In 2003, SEIU Local 1199 filed a lawsuit to challenge the per-
ception that the state’s publicly subsidized providers were in-
dependent contractors as opposed to public-sector employees.172 
A similar tactic had failed in California when SEIU attempted 
unsuccessfully to persuade the courts that publicly subsidized 
home care workers in Los Angeles County were employees of 
the County.173 Yet SEIU Local 1199 had surprising early suc-
cess when the Rhode Island Labor Relations Board (RILRB) 
ruled that the providers were state employees and issued an 
order giving them the right to unionize under the state’s collec-
tive bargaining statute.174 Unfortunately, the success proved to 
be short-lived, as Rhode Island’s Republican governor filed a 
lawsuit blocking the decision. Eventually, the Rhode Island 
Superior Court sided with the governor and reversed the 
RILRB’s decision.175  
Following this defeat, SEIU lobbied to change the law, re-
sulting in a bill known as the Family Child Care Providers 
Business Opportunity Act,176 which retreated from the union’s 
earlier position that the providers were unqualified state em-
ployees. Instead, the Act authorized the recognition of the pro-
viders as state employees only with respect to collective bar-
 
 171. The other two states are California and Massachusetts. See CHALFIE 
ET AL., supra note 66, at 12.  
 172. See In re R.I., Dep’ts of DCYF & DHS (Home Daycare Providers), EE- 
3671, slip op. at 8 (R.I. State Labor Relations Board Apr. 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.dlt.state.ri.us/lrb/pdfs/Decisions/DecisionEE3671.pdf. The Rhode 
Island State Labor Relations Act is codified in R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-7-1 to  
-7-48 (2003). 
 173. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Home Daycare Providers, EE-3671, slip op. at 29. 
 175. State v. State Labor Relations Bd., C.A. 04-1899, 2005 WL 3059297, at 
*8 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005); see also ANNE RODER & DORIE SEAVEY, IN-
VESTING IN LOW-WAGE WORKERS 40 (2006), available at http://www 
.workingventures.org/ppv/publications/assets/206_publication.pdf. 
 176. H.R. 6099 (Substitute A as amended), 2005 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. 
(R.I. 2005), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText05/HouseText05/ 
H6099Aaa.pdf. 
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gaining.177 In 2005, the General Assembly passed the bill, only 
to see it vetoed by the governor.178 While the union has contin-
ued its efforts to reintroduce a similar bill in the legislature, 
the providers’ best chance of securing collective bargaining 
rights at this point may well depend on a change in political 
climate.179  
More recently, publicly subsidized family child care provid-
ers in Maryland encountered a major roadblock. For five years, 
SEIU tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Maryland legisla-
ture to pass a bill to extend bargaining rights to providers.180 
When the legislature failed to do so, the providers turned to the 
new Democratic governor, Martin O’Malley. In August 2007, 
O’Malley signed an executive order that allowed providers to 
designate an organization as their joint negotiating representa-
tive, and that required a state agency to meet and negotiate 
with the representative on all matters relating to reimburse-
ment rates and other terms and conditions of the labor ar-
rangement.181  
Shortly after the order was signed, the providers voted to 
join SEIU Local 500.182 The day before, however, a judge issued 
a temporary restraining order halting the executive order.183 
Notably, the motion for the order was filed by the Maryland 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Donald Carcieri, Governor, Rhode Island, Child Care Veto Message 
(June 22, 2005), available at http://www.governor.ri.gov/documents/Child_ 
Care_Veto_Message.pdf; see also RODER & SEAVEY, supra note 175, at 40. 
 179. A change in political climate ultimately led to the extension of labor 
law rights to publicly subsidized family child care providers in New York. In 
2007, providers finally received the right to elect a representative that will be 
recognized by the state when newly elected Governor Eliot Spitzer signed an 
executive order that requires the state to recognize a representative elected by 
the providers and to meet with designated representatives “for the purpose of 
entering into a written agreement to the extent feasible.” N.Y. Exec. Order No. 
12 (May 8, 2007), available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/executive_orders/ 
exeorders/12.html. 
 180. Tom LoBianco, O’Malley’s Orders Skirt Assembly, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 
16, 2007, at B3.  
 181. Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2007.14 (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http:// 
www.gov.state.md.us/executiveorders/01.01.07.14childcareproviders.pdf. 
 182. Clifford G. Cumber, Local Child Care Providers Support Move to Un-
ionize, FREDERICK NEWS-POST (Md.), Sept. 27, 2007, at B12. 
 183. See Md. State Family Child Care Ass’n v. O’Malley, No. C-07-291 (Ce-
cil County Ct. Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.msfcca.org/case1.pdf 
and http://www.msfcca.org/case2.pdf (granting temporary restraining order); 
see also Tom LoBianco, Judge Halts O’Malley Order, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
2007, at A1; Sarah Moses, Child Care Providers Fight Unionization, CUMBER-
LAND TIMES-NEWS (Md.), Oct. 8, 2007, at 1.  
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State Family Child Care Association (MSFCCA), a nonprofit 
organization of family child care providers in the state that had 
long voiced its opposition to SEIU’s family child care cam-
paign.184 In opposing the union, MSFCCA objected to “SEIU’s 
history and organizing tactics” and maintained that it was able 
to effectively represent the providers without charging the un-
ion dues required by SEIU.185 The conflict highlights the impor-
tance of unions forging broad support, including organizations 
already advocating on behalf of providers.186  
  CONCLUSION   
All indicators suggest that the need for paid home-based 
caregiving will remain a pressing issue for the foreseeable fu-
ture. The need for family child care will persist given women’s 
participation in the paid labor market and parental struggles to 
find an acceptable balance between work obligations and pa-
renting responsibilities. Likewise, the demand for home care 
will climb steadily upwards as the baby-boom generation ages. 
Against this backdrop, one can reasonably expect that when it 
comes to publicly funded care in both contexts, states will con-
tinue to rely on workers who are legally considered indepen-
dent contractors, not only because of consumer preference for 
such workers, but also because of their cost-savings’ potential. 
By treating publicly subsidized home-based care workers not as 
state employees but as independent contractors, states are at-
tempting to avoid liability to the workers under applicable em-
ployment and labor statutes.  
This Article has examined the strategies the labor move-
ment has used to reverse this process and to compel state gov-
ernments to accept some responsibility for providing home-
based care workers with decent wages and workplace benefits. 
Even though independent workers in home-based care may not 
technically qualify as public employees, the labor movement 
has relied on various measures—including legislation, gover-
 
 184. O’Malley, No. C-07-291. 
 185. Md. State Family Child Care Ass’n, If You Get a Union Election Bal-
lot, Say No to SEIU (n.d.), available at http://www.msfcca.org/sayno.doc; see 
also Clifford G. Cumber, Family Child Care Providers Expect to Join Union, 
FREDERICK NEWS-POST (Md.), Sept. 25, 2007, at A11. 
 186. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 6 (“If family child care pro-
viders already have a voice in early care and education policy making, unions 
should respect the work being done and attempt to partner with existing fami-
ly child care advocates, rather than ignoring and attempting to supplant 
them.”). 
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nor-issued executive orders, ballot initiatives, and intergo-
vernmental cooperation agreements—to force states to extend 
labor law rights to workers, most commonly by requiring a 
state agency to function as an employer of record for the work-
ers and to recognize a labor representative on their behalf. 
With this approach, unions can enable home-based care work-
ers to participate in shaping the terms and conditions of their 
work experiences, while simultaneously respecting the inter-
ests of care recipients.  
